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Abstract
The recent wave of attention to partisan gerrymandering has come with a push
to refine or replace the laws that govern political redistricting around the country.
A common element in several states’ reform efforts has been the inclusion of com-
petitiveness metrics, or scores that evaluate a districting plan based on the extent to
which district-level outcomes are in play or are likely to be closely contested.
In this paper, we examine several classes of competitiveness metrics motivated
by recent reform proposals and then evaluate their potential outcomes across large
ensembles of districting plans at the Congressional and state Senate levels. This
is part of a growing literature using MCMC techniques from applied statistics to
situate plans and criteria in the context of valid redistricting alternatives. Our
empirical analysis focuses on five states—Utah, Georgia, Wisconsin, Virginia, and
Massachusetts—chosen to represent a range of partisan attributes. We highlight
situation-specific difficulties in creating good competitiveness metrics and show that
optimizing competitiveness can produce unintended consequences on other partisan
metrics. These results demonstrate the importance of (1) avoiding writing detailed
metric constraints into long-lasting constitutional reform and (2) carrying out careful
mathematical modeling on real geo-electoral data in each redistricting cycle.
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1 Introduction
In 2018 alone, five states saw redistricting reform measures passed by voters at the ballot
box, signaling a larger movement to revisit redistricting rules in state laws and constitu-
tions in the run-up to the 2020 Census. A common feature in this surge of reform efforts is
redoubled scrutiny of the rules, priorities, and criteria for new districting plans. In addition
to reconsidering the treatment of traditional districting principles like population balance,
compactness, and preservation of municipal boundaries, most of these state reforms explic-
itly address the use of partisan data and metrics in the redistricting process.
One reform approach in the recent trend has been to bar mapmakers from partisan
considerations. Several states broadly prohibit favoring political parties or incumbents,
while others go further and restrict mapmakers from directly using any partisan data while
drawing the lines. At the opposite extreme, other reform approaches mandate that cer-
tain types of partisan symmetry or fairness metrics should be important decision criteria,
effectively requiring that partisan data be taken into account during map construction.
Competitiveness rules fall into the second category.1
This new attention to redistricting criteria is taking place in the context of an explosion
of data and computational power in redistricting. One consequence of this new era of
computational redistricting is that methods for locking in partisan advantage—and data
proxies that make this possible without explicitly optimizing for election outcomes—create
major opportunities for abuse. At the same time, computationally sophisticated ensemble
techniques are improving dramatically at detecting partisan outliers. In this paper we
devote our attention to a second, complementary application of algorithmically-generated
ensembles of plans: we use them to study the effects of enacting different sets of rules and
priorities. In particular, we will develop a point of view that ensembles can reveal some
districting tasks to be more “elastic” than others: control of line-drawing always confers
1Some reform measures explicitly provide for a firewall between partisan-blind and partisan-aware parts
of the process. For instance, Utah’s successful ballot initiative in 2018 requires the maps to be drawn
without considering partisan data but requires the expected partisan behavior to be measured before a
plan can be approved [12]. Arizona requires similar behavior from its redistricting commission; the relevant
portion of the redistricting law says that “Party registration and voting history data shall be excluded from
the initial phase of the mapping process but may be used to test maps for compliance...” [34]. In these
cases, the process is designed to prevent mapmakers from directly optimizing for the metrics and instead
sets up a failsafe against intended or unintended partisan skew.
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some control of outcomes, but some situations prove to be more manipulable than others.
Our main focus here is on rules favoring electoral competitiveness. Competitiveness is
frequently regarded as a healthy attribute of elections that promotes voter engagement,
responsiveness, and accountability of representatives, among other benefits.2 During an
election, competitiveness of a race might be measured by close polling or by candidate
spending; after the fact, it is often assessed by a close outcome. It is much harder to
capture the competitiveness level of districting plans at earlier stages, since they are created
before there are outcomes, polling, or even a choice of candidates for the coming cycle.
Accordingly, there is no agreed-upon means of measuring competitiveness, and states have
operationalized it in different ways when they have defined it at all. It is far from clear that
a high competitiveness score can be achieved by a plan without other partisan consequences
or unintended costs to other districting criteria, or that it will bring about outcomes that
increase legitimacy and public trust. With these questions in mind, in this paper we develop
statistical techniques to probe the consequences of various ways to quantify competitiveness
of districting plans.
The primary reason that it is difficult to evaluate the potential consequences of altering
or reordering redistricting criteria is that each set of rules and constraints constructs a dif-
ferent universe of valid plans, and those spaces are vast and complex. Since the set of valid
plans typically is too large to enumerate, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods are
standard techniques in applied mathematics and statistics for sampling in these situations,
used to gather representative samples from the space of interest. Markov chain sampling is
currently used by several groups of researchers to evaluate the partisan nature of proposed
or enacted districting plans in court challenges [17, 10, 11, 19, 23, 24]. These methods
work by constructing large ensembles of plans that satisfy the rules set forth in each state
and comparing the statistics of enacted plans to aggregate statistics of the distribution.
These techniques, however, require the choice of mathematical specifications of the legal
constraints, which are rarely written with enough precision to determine an unambiguous
2For instance, consider this language in Colorado’s recent redistricting reform legislation: “Competitive
elections for members of the United States House of Representatives provide voters with a meaningful
choice among candidates, promote a healthy democracy, help ensure that constituents receive fair and
effective representation, and contribute to the political well-being of key communities of interest and
political subdivisions” [35].
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formulation. Understanding the interactions between various districting criteria is funda-
mental for drawing meaningful quantitative conclusions from ensemble analysis, and we
hope that this study provides an invitation for more research in this direction.
1.1 Contributions
We analyze several variants of competitiveness metrics and compare the effects of prioritiz-
ing them in different ways. We use both neutral ensembles of alternative districting plans
(i.e., generated without considering partisan data) and heuristically-optimized plans that
seek to extremize the metrics for Congressional and state Senate plans in five states.3 We
aim this discussion at two primary audiences. The first is legislators and reform groups
who are actively working to formulate new redistricting rules, particularly those consider-
ing imposing competitiveness criteria. The second audience is researchers and quantitative
analysts who are interested in assessing how well proposed plans uphold the stated criteria
from which they were constructed. A message that emerges for both groups is the major
impact of seemingly innocuous modeling choices against the idiosyncratic political geog-
raphy of individual states. We argue that no universal metric of competitiveness should
be adopted across the country, but rather that there is a fresh choice to be made in each
circumstance. On the other hand, we find that certain metrics are unreasonable and should
not be adopted.
For instance, packing and cracking are the tools of the trade for gerrymandering, so
it is notable that in certain circumstances, a competitiveness metric can approve or even
incentivize packed and cracked plans. For instance, in a state with 68-32 voting for Party
A, a plan that arranges A voters into some districts at 48% share and compensates that
with other districts at 88% share could be textbook vote dilution while looking excellent
under a metric that merely counts nearly-balanced districts. If an arrangement like that
were the only or the predominant way to satisfy a competitiveness priority, then this would
be important to know in advance of enactment. A principal contribution of our ensemble
3The only reason not to consider state House plans is that House districts tend to be too small to be
made out of whole precincts while maintaining tolerable population deviation. Precincts are the smallest
level at which we have authoritatively accurate election outcomes, which are a crucial element of this style
of analysis. Vote results can be prorated to smaller units, but this is done at the cost of a potentially
significant loss of accuracy.
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analysis is that it escapes the tendency to treat votes as though they are geographically
unbound and fluidly rearrangeable, instead studying the actual elasticity of the vote by
comparing to alternative geographic partitions.
In our treatment, a general discussion of the reasons for preferring competitive districts
in terms of broad alignment with societal and democratic goals will remain in the back-
ground. These normative questions are extremely important, but they are beyond the scope
of the present paper and outside the reach of ensemble techniques, except to the extent
that these techniques clarify the desirable and undesirable consequences of the norms.
1.2 Related work
Approaches to competitiveness in the political science literature vary widely. Although
most recent reform efforts have focused on making more competitive districts, arguments
have been made for instead packing districts with members of a single party to the extent
practicable [4]. The opposite situation was considered in [20], where regression analysis was
used to detect correlations between traditional districting criteria and competitive districts
in the 1990 and 2000 cycles. They found that rules prioritizing population constraints as
well as preservation of communities of interest and municipal boundaries were associated
with more competitive districts. Additionally, their analysis helped expose the complexity
of interactions between multiple redistricting criteria and the tradeoffs that are inherent in
the process. Our work extends theirs by using ensembles to consider the potential impacts
of directly incentivizing competitiveness, evaluating the properties of many alternative
districting plans rather than the currently-enacted maps. Our analysis does not model the
impacts of whether the lines are drawn by legislatures, courts, or commissions. Several
groups of political scientists have studied the relationship between the identity of the line-
drawers and the degree of competitiveness in subsequent elections [7, 14, 21, 22, 31], with
mixed conclusions.
A recent article by Cottrell [13] presents an ensemble analysis to evaluate the impact of
gerrymandering on the level of political competition around the country, concluding that
gerrymandering has only a small cost in competitiveness because neutral processes also
produce safe seats at rates similar to what can now be observed. We refer the reader to
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his references for a broad discussion of the arguments around competitive standards in the
political science literature. This differs from our approach both in goals and methods, but
we view our problem domain as complementary to his. In terms of goals, Cottrell seeks
evidence of gerrymandering, while we study the impact of rules that favor competitive
outcomes. That means he is comparing neutral ensembles to enacted plans, and we are
focused on comparing neutral ensembles to methods for favoring competitive outcomes.
Another difference is that our analysis uses a newly-developed Markov chain technique
with strong evidence of sampling effectiveness.4
1.3 Review of competitiveness language in legal criteria
Our research is motivated by several recent examples of redistricting rules introduced at
the state level to promote competitive districts.
1.3.1 Washington, New York, Arizona
Some states had competitiveness language on the books before the recent reform wave,
but not with quantitative details. Washington requires its commission to “provide fair
and effective representation and to encourage electoral competition” and New York’s rules
require that “districts not be drawn to discourage competition” [37, 43].
Arizona’s instructions to its commission include the following language: “To the extent
practicable, competitive districts should be favored where to do so would create no sig-
nificant detriment to the other goals” [34]. In practice, out of 9 districts, this text seems
to suggest a conspicuous effort to craft 3 competitive districts (53-47 outcomes or closer
in 2012), leaving 4 safe Republican districts and 2 safe Democratic districts (all 60-40 or
farther).
1.3.2 Colorado
In 2018, Colorado voters approved a ballot initiative that included a requirement that plans
“maximize the number of politically competitive districts,” where competitive is defined
4With the recombination technique used here, collecting 100,000 plans from a Markov chain is shown
to be enough in many circumstances to obtain a consistent distribution of sample statistics, regardless of
starting point. See [17] and its references for details.
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as “having a reasonable potential for the party affiliation of the district’s representative
to change at least once between federal decennial censuses” [35]. A literal reading of this
language suggests that any district in which both parties have at least a 13% projected
chance of winning might match the Colorado law, since (1 − 0.13)5 ≈ 0.5. While this
interpretation makes several potentially unrealistic assumptions (including that a point
prediction would carry through over the full cycle and that there is no impact of incumbency
on the elections), the text of the legislation does not provide implementation details.5
1.3.3 Missouri
Missouri’s 2018 constitutional amendment, passed through a voter referendum known as
Clean Missouri, defines competitiveness in terms of a partisan metric called the efficiency
gap, or EG [36]. It is one of the more detailed descriptions of a competitiveness metric
in the recent reform measures, requiring the state demographer to create a blended voting
index by computing the turnout-weighted averages of the Presidential, Senatorial, and
Gubernatorial elections that occurred during the previous census cycle. This pattern of
votes is then modified by applying a uniform partisan swing of {−5,−4, . . . ,+4,+5} and
recomputing the efficiency gap against each modified vote dataset. Proposed districting
plans are to be constructed so that each of the corresponding EG values is “as close to zero
as practicable”—we call this EG/swing zeroing. We will show in §2.4 that this definition
of competitiveness promotes drastically different qualitative properties of districting plans
than the other metrics, and if taken literally it actually puts an upper limit on the number
of districts that are allowed to fall in the 45-55% range for its voting index.
Missouri’s reform is also noteworthy in that it places a higher priority on compliance
with the priority on competitiveness than on contiguity or compactness of the plan.
1.3.4 New Jersey
Finally, in 2019, New Jersey’s legislature debated a constitutional amendment that defined
a competitive district to be one where the expected voting outcome is within 5% of the
5This rule compares interestingly to the measure of competitiveness used by the 538 Atlas of Redis-
tricting [6]. The Atlas project defined districts in the range from D+5 to R+5 as competitive, using the
CPVI metric described in §2.3. Under their vote modeling, this corresponds to projected probabilities of
approximately 18%− 82% of electing a candidate from a given party.
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statewide average over the previous census cycle [25]. A plan was defined to be sufficiently
competitive if 25% of its districts were competitive. The bill was widely pilloried (and
ultimately defeated) because in a state whose recent voting trends ≈ 57% Democratic, a
district must have a Democratic majority to count as competitive under this language.
These examples and others demonstrate a range of efforts intended to quantify and
promote “competitiveness” in districting plan design. Our analysis below defines mathe-
matical formalizations in keeping with the legal language reviewed above to study potential
impacts of implementation.
2 Competitiveness metrics
We consider several types of competitiveness metrics in this paper, motivated by the re-
cently proposed legislation in several states discussed above.
2.1 Plans and votes
Characterizing a districting plan or individual district as competitive necessarily requires
some assumptions about the underlying voter behavior. That is, if we denote a districting
plan by D and a vote pattern by ∆, then all scores C of competitiveness are really functions
of both: C = C(D,∆). The choice of ∆ that allows the most robust assessment of a Con-
gressional or legislative districting plan is a matter of some debate. Some political scientists
insist that it is important to use only endogenous data, or vote patterns from the same type
of election, but the partisan preference information in these patterns is confounded by other
variables such as incumbency, uncontested races, and particular candidate characteristics.
Other scholars prefer the use of statewide exogenous vote patterns, but then must make a
case about the choice of which election or elections to use to create an informative voting
index. See for instance [2, 3, 29] for a paper and series of responses on this issue. In all
cases, care is required in terms of predictive claims about future voting. We discuss the
choice of ∆ in more detail in §3.2.
Several states that require partisan analyses of proposed plans have addressed the choice
of election data in their legislation. As noted above, Missouri specifies the exact election
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data that must be used to evaluate partisan performance [36], while Colorado simply re-
quires [35] that “[c]ompetitiveness may be measured by factors such as a proposed district’s
past election results, a proposed district’s political party registration data, and evidence-
based analyses of proposed districts.” New Jersey’s proposed amendment [25], had it
passed, also would have specified exactly which data was to be considered. As with many
of the other variables in redistricting legislation, there does not appear to be a consensus
around the optimal modeling choice.
The results and visualizations reported below are based on a fixed vote pattern: we
use ∆ =Pres16, i.e., the precinct-level election returns from the 2016 Presidential election,
restricted only to the Democratic and Republican votes cast. No aspect of our method
hinges on this choice, and it can be repeated for any other voting pattern in place of ∆.
2.2 Evenness and typicality
Perhaps the most intuitive measure of competitiveness for a district with respect to a vote
pattern is the difference between the two-way vote share and 50%. This metric is implicit
in Arizona’s and Colorado’s legal language. Up to scale, this measures the number of votes
needed to change the outcome in the district. We might consider this a measurement of
evenness, and it aligns well with standard ideas about competitiveness.
The Cook Partisan Voting Index (CPVI) is a widely used metric that is constructed by
comparing the major-party vote share in each geographical unit—precinct, district, etc.—to
the nationwide average across the two most recent Presidential elections [42]. Frequently,
a district is described as competitive if its CPVI value is between D+5 and R+5, meaning
that the district’s vote is within 5% of the nationwide average. Upon inspection, most
observers would agree that in the case that the average is skewed away from 50-50, this
is not measuring competitiveness but rather typicality. Nonetheless, CPVI is reported by
the Cook Political Report after each election as a measure of competitiveness across the
nation; it also was used by 538’s Atlas of Redistricting to count competitive districts [6].
New Jersey’s proposed measure described above was based on an idea similar to CPVI,
except that districts are compared to the statewide instead of nationwide average. Below,
we will denote the statewide share of Democratic voters with D0.
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To measure the effects of quantifying and promoting competitiveness, we compute and
compare metrics of evenness and typicality below with a generalized formulation that we
call vote-band metrics.
2.3 Vote-band metrics
We start by defining a district to be in the (y, z) band with respect to voting pattern ∆,
or simply to be a (y, z) district, if its Democratic vote share is within y of a target z. By
default we will let y, z be denominated in percentage points, so that for instance a district
is in the (5, 50) band with respect to a voting pattern ∆ if its vote share is between 45%
and 55%.
Aggregating this behavior over the districts in a plan, we define (D,∆) to be (x, y, z)
compressed if at least x share of the districts are in the (y, z) band. By varying the
parameters x, y, and z, we can understand the elasticity of a vote pattern ∆ in terms of its
divisibility into districts at a certain scale. If voters of one group are very clustered, there
might be a great deal of control in the hands of the districters by manipulating how the
lines cross the clusters. In case of extreme dispersal, there may be little impact to moving
the lines. And in between those extremes, the spatial distribution of votes and the units of
data discretization combine to create effects on the range of possible outputs. Examining
whether it is possible to compress district-level vote shares into narrow bands of outcomes
is one way to examine how much control the districters have to create districting plans
with precise properties.
A legal standard that employs this type of metric might require that adopted plans be
(x, y, z) compressed, where x, y, z, and the choice of ∆ are set by statute. This encompasses
both many competitiveness rules (where the target is z = 50) and typicality rules (where the
target is z = D0 for state typicality). We will consider how plans that satisfy compression
properties relate to unconstrained plans, along with studying how varying the parameters
affects expected outcomes as a function of political geography.
Figure 1 shows how the currently enacted Congressional and state Senate plans in
Utah, Georgia, Wisconsin, Virginia, and Massachusetts relate to competitiveness and state-
typicality bands at y = 5, using 2016 Presidential vote data. Table 2 records the number
11
MA
VA
WI
GA
UT
Figure 1: Comparison of the enacted Congressional and state Senate plans to (5, 50) bands
(green, competitive) and (5, D0) bands (purple, state-typical). Here and in most plots
below, the districts are ordered from smallest D share to highest to facilitate comparisons
across plans.
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of districts in those plans that fall into each band. Although none of these states had
requirements governing competitiveness when the plans were drawn, they provide a starting
example for considering the consequences of vote-band rules.
State # Cong # Sen D0 in 2012-16 CVPI
Districts Districts Pres16
Massachusetts 9 40 64.7 D+12
Virginia 11 40 52.8 D+1
Wisconsin 8 33 49.6 Even
Georgia 14 56 47.3 R+5
Utah 4 29 37.6 R+20
Table 1: The five states considered in our study, chosen for a wide range of partisan tilts.
The Democratic share D0 is the two-party share in Pres16, so that for instance the sizeable
third party vote in Utah is not reflected.
In most states, several districts lie outside both bands. Given fixed (y, z), there is
no guarantee that it is even possible to construct a plan with a large number of (y, z)
districts—even if z is near the statewide average—while adhering to reasonable compactness
and boundary preservation norms. In Virginia, the enacted plan almost fails to have any
districts that are competitive under both definitions, even though there is a large overlap
between the bands.
One straightforward observation is that there must be some districts at least as far from
50% as the state average. Additionally, as shown in [18], discretization of geographical
units can play a large role in determining the range of possible outcomes, since the voting
population is not infinitely divisible.
Given a fixed vote share target z, it is natural to ask how the number of (y, z) districts
varies as a function of the band width parameter y. Figure 2 shows the number of districts
in the enacted plans that lie in competitive and state-typical bands as the width is increased.
For most of the current plans, y values of approximately 15-20% would be needed to make
half of the districts competitive; that is, about half the districts have outcomes even more
skewed than 70-30. Also, as one would expect, it is harder to make even districts in the
states that are themselves more partisan-tilted. Comparing Utah and Massachusetts to the
other states shows the extent of this effect.
In our experiments, we will explore the interaction of vote-band metrics with political
13
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Figure 2: Number of districts in the enacted Congressional and state Senate plans that are
(y, 50) (green, competitive) and (y,D0) (purple, state-typical), as y varies. For instance,
all four of Utah’s congressional districts are within 10% of the state average.14
geography. Although this formulation is simple, we will see that the impacts of enforcing
a choice of parameters x, y, and z do not fall uniformly over our test states.
2.4 EG/swing zeroing
As discussed above, Missouri has adopted a definition of competitiveness for redistricting
that requires the State Demographer to compute a metric called the efficiency gap (de-
scribed below) for any proposed districting plan, with respect to a particular synthetic vote
pattern created by a weighted combination of recent election outcomes. They are also re-
quired to consider ten alterations of that vote pattern, obtained by uniformly swinging the
district vote shares by {±1,±2,±3,±4,±5} and computing the corresponding efficiency
gap values. A literal reading of the constitutional text requires that each of those eleven
efficiency gap values should be made as small as practicable. Due to the close relation-
ship between efficiency gap and seat outcomes, many authors have noted that EG ≈ 0
prescribes a “winner’s bonus” with slope two in the votes to seats conversion [38, 39, 1].6
Here, we show that this constraint is directly at odds with vote-band competitiveness.
Let D0 represent the statewide percentage of Democratic voters and S represent the
number of seats won by the Democratic party, out of k total seats. Then, as derived by
Veomett in [39], the efficiency gap is
EG(D,∆) = 2
(
D0
100
)
− S
k
− 1
2
+ N(D,∆),
where N(D,∆) is a noise term depending on S, k, and the average turnout in districts won
by each party, which is zero in the case of equal turnout.7 Noting that D0 is fixed and
neglecting the noise term, we must minimize this expression to satisfy the constitutional
requirement, which amounts to securing a number of Democratic seats S as close as possible
6That is, having EG ≈ 0 requires having a tight relationship between overall vote share and overall seat
share, with each additional percentage point of votes calling for two additional percentage points of seats.
Since seats must turn out in a particular way to satisfy the EG test, there is a completely different reason
that it is at odds with competitiveness: competitive seats introduce uncertainty and the potential for an
unpredictable EG score [1].
7Indeed, publications by Stephanopoulos–McGhee sometimes use this full definition of EG and some-
times use the “simplified formula” without the N term. Converting from Veomett’s notation to ours and
letting s = S/k and ρ be the ratio of average turnout in districts won by Party A to those won by Party
B, we have N = s(s−1)(1−ρ)s(1−ρ)+ρ . This vanishes in the equal-turnout case ρ = 1.
15
to k(2D0
100
− 1
2
). Repeating this procedure for each of {D0 − 5, D0 − 4, . . . , D0 + 4, D0 + 5}
gives us a sequence of eleven prescribed seat values, S−5 ≤ S−4 ≤ · · ·S4 ≤ S5. But we
further observe that prescribing how the seat values change as you shift the votes 5 points
up and down is precisely equivalent to prescribing the number and position of seats in the
(5, 50) band.
To show the potential impacts of this EG/swing zeroing rule, consider Missouri and
Wisconsin. With respect to Pres16, Missouri had roughly D0 = 40.
8 First we work out
the consequences of the competitiveness rule on the 8-seat Congressional map, though we
note that the Clean Missouri constitutional reform only applies to legislative districting.
Continuing to neglect turnout noise, we observe that EG(D,∆ + i) = 2(D0+i
100
) − S
8
− 1
2
,
which prescribes S = 2 Democratic seats for shifts between R+ 5 and R+ 0 and by S = 3
seats for D + 1 through D + 5. This can only be satisfied by having one district with a
Democratic share of between 49 and 50 percent and no others between 45 and 55 percent.
If the Democratic shares by district were roughly (22, 22, 22, 22, 22, 49.5, 80, 80), the plan
would earn perfect marks for “competitiveness” by this EG-swing definition. Having more
districts close to even would rate strictly worse.
With a bit more arithmetic, we can extract the pattern. Noting that minimizing EG
amounts to solving S
k
≈ 2V − 1
2
, we replace V with its extreme values D0−5
100
and D0+5
100
.
The difference between the largest and smallest number of required D seats is exactly the
number required to fall in the 45-55 range. That is, accounting for rounding to the nearest
integer, this rule prescribes that the number of (5, 50) seats is equal to k/5 or one-fifth of
the available seats, plus or minus no more than one, no matter whether D0 is 35 or 40 or
45 or 50.9 So, in Missouri’s 34-seat Senate, the rule will require precisely 6-7 seats to fall
between 45 and 55 percent, with at least 27 safe seats, and in the 163-seat House, it will
require 32-33 close outcomes, with at least 130 safe seats.
In Wisconsin, which had roughly D0 = 49.6, the EG-swing standard would require
two Congressional districts between 45 and 55 percent and six districts outside that range.
8Clean Missouri prescribes that the vote pattern be constructed from the last three races for Governor,
Senate, and President. At the time of writing, this amounts to a D0 = 50.3, but when it is computed in
2021 it is likely to drop to the mid-40s. Interestingly, the number of competitive districts required by the
rule is barely sensitive to the value of D0.
9For values of D0 more extreme than 30-70, the allotment for close seats actually goes down as the
efficiency gap demands virtually all safe seats for the majority party.
16
Again, this optimization promotes the creation of many safe districts and is indifferent to
the possibility that those are actually made into landslide districts. This effect is more
dramatic in Utah (D0 = 37, k = 4), where adherence to this rule would require that
Democrats are ahead in precisely one Congressional district out of four, for all of the swing
values. That is, a Utah plan complying with this definition of competitiveness would not
be allowed to have any districts within 45 and 55 percent.
This construction is in tension with the plain-English notion, in which a plan is said
to be more competitive when more districts are close to even. In some states, demanding
that one-fifth of seats (and no more) be competitive might be a reasonable goal and an
improvement over the status quo; in other states, it will not be possible or will have major
unintended consequences. Considering that this definition also entails a specific number of
safe seats for each side, it is not easily separated from a very prescriptive partisan outcome
rule and clearly calls for careful partisan tailoring. We will not continue to model more
refined consequences of adopting this kind of metric below, but will focus on vote-band
definitions.
3 Data and methods for ensemble analysis
We analyze the potential effects of enforcing a vote-band rule as described in §2.3 in two
sets of experiments, using data from five states. First, we generate a large neutral ensemble
of districting plans for each state and filter the plans according to increasingly strict vote-
band constraints, comparing the properties of the compressed plans to those of the full
ensemble. Next, we use two heuristic optimization techniques to generate plans that score
well on the given competitiveness measure and compare the statistics of the optimized
plans to that of the full ensemble.
3.1 State data
In our study, we focus on Georgia, Massachusetts, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin, as ex-
emplar states that display a wide range of partisan leans (see Table 1). The CVPI baseline
over this time period is approximately 51.5%, as the Democratic party candidate narrowly
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won the popular vote in both the 2012 and 2016 elections.
Our methodology uses a discrete formulation of redistricting, viewing a plan as a graph
partition for each given state. This is defined with respect to the precinct dual graph,
which has a node for each precinct and an edge between two nodes if the corresponding
precincts are adjacent. (“Dual graph” is a mathematical term for a graph that records
adjacency patterns.) Given a fixed number of districts k, a districting plan is a partition of
this graph into k connected subgraphs. Each node is decorated with the population of the
corresponding precinct and its vote counts with respect to the election ∆, so the population
and partisan performance of each district can be computed by summing over the nodes.
This discrete approach has enabled a growing literature on sampling techniques in court
cases and in scientific literature [9, 11, 17, 23].
To construct the dual graph for each state, we use precinct shapefiles with population
and vote data joined.10
3.2 Partisan metrics
The choice of Pres16 as the vote pattern ∆ for these runs makes it easier to compare
results across states and is consonant with the CVPI approach and with several other
political science analyses. We note, however, that the resemblance between Presidential
and Congressional or Legislative voting patterns varies greatly from state to state and from
year to year, and we do not feel that the lessons learned from this analysis hinge on there
being a close match.
Nevertheless, we can observe that the number of districts with a Democratic majority
in Pres16 matches the actual Congressional 2016 outcome in MA, GA, and UT (with
10The underlying geographic and partisan data for each state was originally obtained from the following
sources. Georgia: Geography from the Georgia General Assembly Legislative and Congressional Reap-
portionment Office [27]; partisan data from MIT Elections Data and Science Lab (MEDSL) [26]. Utah:
Geography from the Utah Automated Geographic Reference Center [8]; partisan data from MEDSL. Wis-
consin: All geographic and partisan data from the Wisconsin Legislative Technology Services Bureau [5].
Virginia: All geographic and partisan data from the Princeton Gerrymandering Project OpenPrecincts
project [33]. Massachusetts: Geography from the Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth and
partisan data from the Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth Elections Division [32]. Staff of the
Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Group joined population data from the 2010 US Census to these
datasets by aggregating up from census blocks, then used geospatial tools to clean the geographical data.
The processed shapefiles and metadata are publicly available for download [30].
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9/9, 4/14, and 0/4 Democratic-majority districts, respectively), while assigning one D
seat too many in Virginia and one too few in Wisconsin (where the enacted plan laid over
Pres16 voting gives 5/11 and 2/8 Democratic-majority districts, respectively). We have also
carried out the trials reported below with respect to recent U.S. Senate and Gubernatorial
elections where data was available; the findings are broadly similar, with the same big-
picture messages about the relative elasticity and the between-state variability of voting
patterns.
To evaluate the partisan side effects of competitiveness rules on districting plans, we use
three partisan metrics, again without taking a stance on which of these is the best or most
useful. Rather, we seek the presence of interrelations. The first partisan metric is simply
the number of districts in which the number of Democratic votes exceeds the number of
Republican votes (discussed above in this section). A second metric, defined in §2.4, is the
efficiency gap. Finally, a third popular partisan metric is the mean-median (MM) score,
a measure of asymmetry that is defined by subtracting the mean Democratic vote share
across the districts of a plan from the median of the same list of values. Drawing on the
work of Bernard Grofman, Gary King, and others, this metric is sometimes described as
measuring how much one party could fall short of 50% of the statewide votes while still
receiving 50% of the seats [28, 41]. Symmetry metrics are explicitly included in Utah’s
reform language from 2018 [12].
3.3 Ensemble generation
We use open-source software GerryChain [40] both for generating the neutral ensembles
and for optimizing for competitive districts. GerryChain uses a Markov chain to gener-
ate districting plans, beginning with an initial state and making iterative changes to the
assignments of the nodes. Our ensembles are constructed using the ReCom Markov chain
procedure overviewed in [17], which uses a spanning tree method to bipartition pairs of
adjacent districts at each step.
For the neutral ensembles, we require the districts to be connected and population-
balanced, imposing no further restrictions.11 We constrain the population to within 2% of
11As described in [17], ReCom produces plans with compactness scores in range of human-made plans
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ideal for Congressional districts and within 5% for state Senate districts.12 For each state,
we take 100,000 ReCom steps for the Congressional plans and 1,000,000 steps for state
Senate plans, beginning at a random seed generated by a recursive tree-based partition;
plans with more districts will require more recombination moves to achieve a high-quality
sample. See [17] for a workflow describing standard heuristic tests of sample convergence,
such as independence of seed and stability under increases in run length.
For the heuristic optimization ensembles, we use two types of hill-climbing proposals
to find elevated numbers of (5, 50) districts. We call these methods Opt1 and Opt2 and
construct 100 plans using each. We can take far fewer steps here than in constructing
ensembles because we are not trying to sample, but only to find extreme examples. To
generate each plan, we start with a number of unconstrained ReCom steps (200 for Congress,
1000 for Senate) and then attempt 1,000,000 Flip steps, each proposing to change the
assignment of a single node on the boundary to move toward a more competitive plan.
The unconstrained steps serve to decrease correlation to the last map before attempting
the greedy Flip proposals. In the Opt1 run, proposed plans are rejected if they decrease the
number of (5, 50) districts. In the Opt2 run, a proposed plan is accepted if it decreases the
sum of the distances between the district Dem shares and the 45-55 percent band. Because
Flip steps tend towards poor compactness scores, these steps are additionally constrained
to have no more than twice as many cut edges as the partition after the ReCom steps.
4 Ensemble results
In the previous section, we describe how to generate large ensembles of compact, contiguous,
population-balanced maps that do not take partisan data into account. It is important to
note how we propose to use these neutral ensembles for comparisons. We do not propose
that matching summary statistics to, say, the mean or median of a neutral ensemble is
without any need to impose additional compactness constraints. Compactness is measured by a discrete
metric called cut edges, which counts how many pairs of units were adjacent in the state but are assigned
to different districts—these are the edges that would have to be cut to separate the whole graph into its
district subgraphs.
12Most states balance Congressional districts to within one person, but 2% balanced plans can readily
be tuned to tight balance by a skilled human mapmaker. With 1 or 2% deviation, we get efficiently moving
Markov chains. In other studies we have confirmed that loosening or tightening population balance does
not have substantial impacts on partisan summary statistics [15].
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a normative goal in redistricting, and we do not view the neutral ensembles as strictly
bounding the range of possibilities. Instead, they provide a baseline range for any scores
and metrics we might study, constructed only by the basic rules of redistricting and the
political and physical geography of the state.
The key takeaway is that baseline ranges for partisan metrics are sensitively dependent
both on the formulation of the competitiveness metric and on the underlying political
geography, which controls the elasticity of the vote. For this reason, great care should
be taken to evaluate potential impacts of these rules, using data representing the actual
distribution of voters across the state, before adoption.
4.1 Partisan baselines
Even for a fixed distribution of votes, the district-by-district vote shares depend, of course,
on the district lines. Figure 3 shows the distributions of the vote share across districts for
each of the full ensembles. In these plots, the districts in each plan are arranged from the
one with the lowest Democratic vote share to the one with the highest. The boxes show
the 25th-75th percentile Democratic share, and the whiskers go from 1st-99th percentile.
Thus fatter boxes show a more elastic vote, with more control of partisan outcomes in the
hands of the line-drawer.
In Table 2 we show the average number of (5, 50) and (5, D0) districts across the en-
semble, compared to the enacted plans. The distribution of values observed across the
ensemble is similar to those of the enacted plans, with the exception of Georgia, where the
ensemble finds many more districts in both bands.
The baselines reveal the extent to which the various states’ political geographies shape
the ensemble statistics. With the exception of Virginia, whose MM distribution is centered
at zero, all of the states have significantly Republican-favoring average mean–median scores
of between two and five percent.13 For several ensembles, more than 90% of the plans have a
Republican-favoring score. This adds to a rapidly growing body of evidence that shows that
applying uniform standards across states, without accounting for how voters are distributed
throughout each state, can lead to misleading results and unattainable ideals. For example,
13The standard narrative around mean–median scores holds that MM = .05 means that the Republican
party could expect half of the seats with only 45% of the votes.
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MA
VA
WI
GA
UT
Figure 3: Partisan share boxplots by district for the neutral ensembles in Congress (left)
and state Senate (right).
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State, Type (#) Enacted Ensemble Enacted Ensemble
(x, 5, 50) (x, 5, 50) D0 (x, 5, D0) (x, 5, D0)
MA Cong (9) 0 0.24 64.7 5 3.85
VA Cong (11) 3 2.79 52.8 2 2.82
WI Cong (8) 1 1.76 49.6 1 1.81
GA Cong (14) 2 2.63 47.3 2 4.43
UT Cong (4) 1 0.62 37.6 2 1.05
MA Sen (40) 6 6.85 64.7 13 12.82
VA Sen (40) 6 8.60 52.8 6 8.00
WI Sen (33) 7 8.80 49.6 7 9.10
GA Sen (56) 2 8.57 47.3 4 8.78
UT Sen (29) 2 4.09 37.6 4 4.57
Table 2: Comparison of the number of (5, 50) and (5, D0) districts—close to 50-50 and
close to the state average, respectively—in enacted plans versus ensemble means. Most
cases, the enacted plan has slightly fewer (5, 50) districts than the ensemble average—the
only examples where the enacted plan has more than the mean are Virginia’s and Utah’s
Congressional plans. Georgia and Utah’s Senate numbers stand out from the group in
the other direction, with conspicuously fewer close seats than typical plans in the neutral
ensemble.
a plan whose MM value is typical for the Wisconsin ensemble would be a significant outlier
if evaluated against the Virginia data, even though the difference in statewide average vote
share is small.14
The seats outcomes let us measure the extent of partisan advantage that is entailed by
political geography. For instance, Wisconsin’s vote pattern which was very close to 50-50 in
Pres16, but the most Democratic-favoring plans found by the state Senate ensemble have
only 14/33 ≈ 42% Democratic seats.
4.2 Satisfiable vote-band rules
Too loose of a vote-band rule will impose no constraint at all on redistricting; too tight of a
rule will be impossible to meet. In this section, we examine the level of constraint imposed
by (y, 50) and (y,D0) rules. This effect is explored in Figures 4-5. Figure 4 shows how often
each number of competitive or state-typical districts occurs in a neutral ensemble. This is
14In a similar vein, there is growing evidence that the MM score is not performing as advertised to
signal meaningful partisan advantage [16]. Nonetheless, we use it here to highlight that competitiveness
may not be independent of other popular partisan indicators.
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intended to visualize the elasticity of the vote: a skinny and tall histogram indicates that
moving the lines does not allow much change to the count of a certain type of district, while
a short and fat histogram indicates more freedom to change the outcome by controlling
the district lines. In Figure 5, the same data is presented in a new way to facilitate the
interpretation of candidate rules. The left column shows the existence and proportion of
Congressional plans in the ensemble that are (x, y, 50) compressed, and the right column
shows similar plots for the state Senate. The transition regions for each fixed x value are
relatively small as a function of y; but it is precisely these transition regions in which a
vote-band rule would have any impact. Outside these zones, a vote-band requirement is
either vacuous or is so hard to satisfy that a large ensemble finds no examples at all. At a
minimum, states must perform modeling of this kind using recent electoral patterns before
adopting a numerically specific vote-band rule for competitiveness or typicality.
For all of the states, the neutral ensemble found Congressional plans with no (5, 50)
districts—that is, it is always possible to draw a plan with no districts at all between 45 and
55% partisan share. Even within a fixed state, different vote elasticity may be observed at
different scales. Comparing the behavior of Georgia’s Congressional ensemble to the state
Senate ensemble shows that requiring a fixed proportion of seats to be competitive would
impose a much more constraining condition on the Congressional districts than the state
Senate.
4.3 Partisan impacts of vote-band winnowing
One way that vote-band rules might play out is that among contending plans, those that
best satisfy the rules would be selected. To model this scenario, we now extract subsets of
plans that are (x, y, z) compressed and compare the aggregate properties of these plans to
the full ensemble distributions. Comparing the subset of an ensemble that has a certain
property with the full set from which it was drawn is known as winnowing. This allows us
to observe whether the competitive plans differ from the neutral ensemble in a systematic
fashion under the partisan metrics.
We begin by computing the average number of Democratic seats in districting plans
that are (x, 5, 50) and (x, 5, D0) compressed, as a function of x. Figure 6 shows these results
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for each state we analyzed. For states with a strong statewide party skew, increasing the
number of districts close to the statewide average unsurprisingly tends to shift the seats
outcome in favor of the party with the larger statewide percentage. In tilted states, however,
vying for competitiveness can actually hurt the minority party. The Massachusetts state
Senate results show an example of a potentially surprising consequence of enforcing a
competitiveness constraint. For this ensemble, increasing the number of (5, 50) districts
increases the expected number of Democratic seats. This is because it is easier to create
more seats with a Democratic share of roughly 55% by taking scarce Republican votes from
the few Republican-leaning districts.
The case of Wisconsin (D0 ≈ 50) is particularly interesting, since a vote-band com-
petitive rule for Congress imposes a Democratic advantage, while a similar rule for state
Senate has a Republican lean.
Next, we compare the distributions of mean-median values on the winnowed sub-
ensembles, shown in Figure 7. Again, the histograms show a range of different behaviors
as the constraints are tightened; several cases are worth highlighting. For the case z = 50,
both Wisconsin and Georgia, whose full ensemble averages are Republican-favoring, are
forced towards the center as the constraint tightens, while Virginia, which was balanced
in the full ensemble, becomes more Republican-favoring in both the Congressional and
state Senate ensembles under progressively tighter winnowing. Contrast this behavior with
Utah, where the winnowed Congressional ensemble leans approximately four points towards
Democratic-favoring scores, while the state Senate ensemble looks even more extremely
Republican-favoring.
4.4 Partisan impacts of heuristic optimization
While the previous trials investigated the properties of competitive plans that were observed
in a neutral ensemble, laws mandating competitiveness will also incentivize mapmakers
to optimize for competitive plans. Plans constructed with this aim in mind likely will
be significantly different than those drawn without access to partisan information. To
expose some of these differences, we use the partisan-aware optimization methods Opt1 and
Opt2 (described in §3.3) to construct plans that have significantly more (5, 50) competitive
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districts than were found by the neutral ensemble.
To give an extremely crude sense of the success of these short runs with simple opti-
mization heuristics, we compare our optimization runs to those expressly constructed for
the 538 Atlas of Redistricting to minimize CPVI values (Table 3). The comparison is not
perfect, since the underlying data, models, and evaluation mechanism differ.15 Also, there
are states in which one of the styles of optimization is a bad fit for the task at hand, like
Opt2 in Massachusetts. The similarity between our results and theirs, however, suggests
that our simple optimization heuristics have some power. An interesting direction for fu-
ture work would be to use the precinct-sorting methods from [18] to get rigorous upper
bounds on the possible number of competitive districts.
State, Type, 538 Atlas of Neutral Opt1 Opt1 Opt2 Opt2
(Total #) Redistricting Max Max Mean Max Mean
MA Cong (9) 4 2 3 2.11 1 0.05
VA Cong (11) 9 7 8 7.33 9 6.61
WI Cong (8) 6 5 6 3.99 8 4.28
GA Cong (14) 7 8 12 9.41 14 10.68
UT Cong (4) 1 2 2 1.99 2 .51
MA Sen (40) – 12 17 15.35 9 5.12
VA Sen (40) – 17 26 23.63 28 20.32
WI Sen (33) – 17 20 17.33 25 15.83
GA Sen (56) – 19 37 32.99 31 20.85
UT Sen (29) – 9 14 11.42 13 6.93
Table 3: Comparison of the number of (5, 50) districts found in the neutral and two styles
of hill-climbing ensembles to the 538 Atlas of Redistricting’s highly competitive plans.
Maximum values highlighted in bold. In most cases, hill-climbing found plans where at
least half the districts are (5, 50) competitive, which differs significantly from the results of
the neutral ensemble.
Comparing to the box plots of Figure 3 gives a measure of how far these optimized
plans are from those in the neutral ensemble. For Georgia Congressional plans, the 1%-
99% whiskers of the box plots only hit the (5, 50) band for five out of 14 districts, but
the optimization method found plans where all 14 districts are in the (5, 50) band. Once
again, we find Georgia to be particularly elastic in its vote distribution and to have enacted
relatively uncompetitive plans. Note we have not made an effort to include the full suite
15For example, the CVPI values use a slightly Democratic-favoring baseline as a result of the popular vote
in the 2016 presidential election, which makes it slightly easier to make competitive districts in Democratic-
leaning states and slightly harder in Republican-leaning ones. Additionally, the 538 maps had constraints
on the number of majority-minority districts.
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of Georgia districting criteria in our model, and the Voting Rights Act in particular might
be quite constraining.
Figure 8 shows the number of Democratic seats against the number of (5, 50) districts
found by the two optimization methods. As with our previous examples, the effects of
promoting plan competitiveness are unpredictable at best, both within states or between
Congressional and state Senate plans in the same state. The plot further highlights that dif-
ferent optimization methods targeting competitiveness can drastically change the partisan
character of the plans that are found.
For Georgia’s Congressional plan, higher numbers of competitive districts correlates
with Republican seat advantage. Wisconsin’s Senate plans show the opposite correlation,
at least for these optimization techniques, tending to find more Democratic seats as the
number of competitive districts increases. The optimization ensembles also found seats
outcomes that did not appear at all in the significantly larger neutral ensembles, which is
a reminder that outcomes that are extremely unlikely under partisan-blind circumstances
may nonetheless be relatively easy to construct intentionally.
As with the winnowing results, these optimization runs show that the potentially ex-
treme impacts of enforcing a competitiveness measure depend heavily and unpredictably
on political geography and scale.
5 Conclusion
In the national conversation around redistricting reform, competitiveness is only one among
numerous priorities, including traditional districting principles such as population balance
or compactness as well as compliance with federal constraints like the Voting Rights Act,
that are being debated and sometimes hastily written into law. Mapping out the interac-
tions between various values, criteria, and constraints is becoming increasingly important.
Data-intensive modeling is indispensable to make informed decisions about these interac-
tions and to identify unintended consequences of quantitatively specific rules. We hope
that reform measures for redistricting will call for this kind of modeling to be performed
in every census cycle.
Ensemble analysis—and Markov chain sampling in particular—is a useful tool for ex-
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ploring these complex spaces and intertwined constraints. The present study sets up a
model methodology for surveying the state-specific partisan landscape in advance of setting
quantitative thresholds and priorities for state reform. For the specific case of competitive-
ness, our results show that vote-band rules can be set in a way that does impose nontrivial
constraints on redistricters, but sometimes with ancillary effects on other partisan metrics.
There is every reason to expect nontrivial effects on the ability to uphold other priorities—
from racial statistics to political boundary integrity—which were not considered here. A
natural direction for future work is to determine how the operationalizations of state leg-
islative language and other constraints impacts these analyses. Evaluating compliance with
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the associated Gingles factors, derived from the 1986
Supreme Court ruling in Thornburgh v. Gingles and its successors, provides an example
of the complexity of this modeling process and determining interactions between this con-
straint and competitiveness metrics is an important consideration for future state-specific
analyses.
As with any other partisan quantity, securing a high score on a competitiveness metric
does not follow effortlessly from the absence of nefarious intent. Democratic deliberation is
called for both to clarify the type of competitiveness that is sought—more close outcomes?
fewer landslides?—and to weigh this against other priorities. As states continue to exper-
iment with their rules and frameworks for redistricting, we hope that statistically robust
ensemble methods become standard tools in the repertoire.
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Democratic seats Mean-median
State, Type Full x1 x2 x3 x4 Full x1 x2 x3 x4
(Total #) Ensemble Ensemble
MA Cong (9) 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 — 0.021 0.021 0.015 0.0094 —
VA Cong (11) 6.35 6.37 6.45 6.66 6.67 −0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005
WI Cong (8) 2.66 2.65 2.67 2.80 3.28 0.044 0.044 0.039 0.026 0.014
GA Cong (14) 4.30 4.30 4.30 4.31 4.30 0.031 0.028 0.024 0.016 0.009
UT Cong (4) 0.85 0.85 0.70 0.70 — 0.018 0.018 −0.004 −0.014 —
MA Sen (40) 38.36 38.38 38.41 38.48 38.59 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.018
VA Sen (40) 21.39 21.38 21.33 21.24 21.16 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.014 0.016
WI Sen (33) 11.65 11.65 11.63 11.59 11.46 0.044 0.044 0.042 0.037 0.034
GA Sen (56) 21.86 21.86 21.86 21.85 21.82 0.042 0.041 0.038 0.032 0.024
UT Sen (29) 7.21 7.22 7.23 7.23 7.22 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.051
Table 4: Mean partisan statistics (Dem seats, mean-median) in the successively winnowed
ensembles shown in Figure 6-7 for z = 50. The xi values correspond to those in the figures.
For example, the table shows the effects of requiring 6, 7, 8, or 9 competitive districts out
of 40 in the MA State Senate, which corresponds to the third figure of the top row of
Figure 6.
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Democratic seats Mean-median
State, Type Full x1 x2 x3 x4 Full x1 x2 x3 x4
(Total #) Ensemble Ensemble
MA Cong (9) 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.015
VA Cong (11) 6.35 6.45 6.61 6.76 6.97 −0.001 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003
WI Cong (8) 2.66 2.65 2.65 2.77 3.24 0.044 0.044 0.040 0.027 0.015
GA Cong (14) 4.30 4.18 4.04 3.85 3.61 0.031 0.028 0.026 0.023 0.021
UT Cong (4) 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.86 0.19 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.021 0.016
MA Sen (40) 38.36 38.36 38.33 38.29 38.25 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019
VA Sen (40) 21.39 21.44 21.59 21.83 22.12 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008
WI Sen (33) 11.65 11.64 11.63 11.57 11.46 0.044 0.044 0.042 0.039 0.035
GA Sen (56) 21.86 21.78 21.59 21.28 20.86 0.042 0.041 0.037 0.033 0.029
UT Sen (29) 7.21 7.20 7.18 7.16 7.11 0.049 0.047 0.045 0.041 0.036
Table 5: Mean partisan statistics (Dem seats, mean-median) in the successively winnowed
ensembles shown in Figure 6-7 for z = D0. The xi values correspond to the successively
smaller color-coded plots in the figures. For example, the table shows the effects of requiring
10, 12, 14, or 16 state-typical districts out of 40 in the MA State Senate, which corresponds
to the fourth figure of the top row of Figure 6.
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Figure 4: How often each number of (5, 50) and (5, D0) districts was observed in the neutral
ensemble. Scale effects are notable in Georgia especially, where the competitiveness and
state-typicality statistics are the same for state Senate but noticeably different for Congress.34
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Figure 5: Visualizing the narrow range of vote-band rules that meaningfully constrain a
neutral ensemble. Congress (left), state Senate (right).
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Figure 6: Histograms of Democratic seat outcomes in (x, y, z) compressed plans as a func-
tion of increasing x. Columns 1-2: Congress, z = 50 and z = D0. Columns 3-4: state
Senate, z = 50 and z = D0. States, top to bottom: MA, VA, WI, GA, UT.
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Figure 7: Successively winnowed mean-median distributions for (x, 5, z) compressed plans
as a function of increasing x. This figure shows how the MM score reacts as more districts
are required to be competitive or state-typical. (The grey histogram is the full ensemble.)
Columns 1-2: Congress, z = 50 and z = D0. Columns 3-4: state Senate, z = 50 and
z = D0. States, top to bottom: MA, VA, WI, GA, UT. Recall that MM = 0 is thought
to signal symmetry between the parties, and positive values are thought to signify Repub-
lican advantage. One thing to note is that all states except Virginia show a baseline of
pronounced Republican advantage by this measure in the neutral ensemble (i.e., with no
partisan gerrymandering).
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Figure 8: Number of Democratic seats in the plans found by the two optimization methods
plotted against the number of (5, 50) districts. The two types of points are slightly displaced
so that they are visible in the plot. 38
